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Abstract
Bidding and Performance in Repo Auctions:
Evidence from ECB Open Market Operations
Repo auctions are used to inject central bank funds against collateral into the banking
sector. The ECB uses standard discriminatory auctions and hundreds of banks participate.
The amount auctioned over the monthly reserve maintenance period is in principle exactly
what banks collectively need to fulfill reserve requirements. We study bidder-level data
and find: (i) Bidder behavior is diﬀerent from what is documented for treasury auctions.
Private information and the winner’s curse seem to be relatively unimportant. (ii) Under-
pricing is positively related to the diﬀerence between the interbank rate and the auction
minimum bid rate, with the latter appearing to be a binding constraint. (iii) Bidders
are more aggressive when the imbalance of awards in the previous auction is larger. (iv)
Large bidders do better than small bidders. Some of our findings suggests that bidders
are concerned with the loser’s nightmare and have limited amounts of the cheapest eligible
collateral.
JEL Classification Numbers: G21, G12, D44, E43, E50.
Keywords: Repo auctions, multiunit auctions, reserve requirements, loser’s nightmare,
money markets, central bank, collateral, open market operations.
1 Introduction
In central bank repo auctions, banks submit bids for borrowing central bank funds on a
collateralized basis. These are among the most economically significant multiunit auctions
in practice. They are widely used to conduct open market operations and are at the heart
of the money markets in many countries or currency areas. For example, the Federal
Reserve Bank holds daily repo auctions for several billion dollars each and the European
Central Bank (ECB) holds weekly repo auctions with an average size of almost 300 billion
euros where hundreds of banks participate. The primary concerns for central banks in
repo auctions are to inject the right amount of central bank money to ensure that the
short term interbank rate stays around the target level and that banks can cover their
liquidity needs, including satisfying reserve requirements. An important reason that banks
participate in the auctions is that the funds are needed to satisfy reserve requirements.
In this paper, we study repo auctions empirically using bidder level data from the ECB.
Our aim is to map out the key economic features of repo auctions with respect to bidding
and auction performance. Our findings should provide useful inputs to theorists aiming to
build realistic models of these auctions and to the policy makers who design them. The
paper also provides an overview of the role repo auctions play in the implementation of
monetary policy in the euro area.
Our dataset includes each individual bidder’s set of bids in 53 consecutive ECB repo
auctions, starting in June 2000 when the ECB switched from fixed rate tenders to discrim-
inatory (pay your bid) auctions.1 All bids are for two-week money and specify a quantity
and a borrowing rate. Unique bidder codes allow us to follow each bidder over time. There
are no “customer bids.” This allows a potentially less noisy inferences on bidder behavior
than what has been possible in the treasury auction literature (see, e.g, Nyborg, Rydqvist,
and Sundaresan, 2002). The auctions follow a regular cycle; there is one every Tuesday
morning. Thus there are up to five regularly scheduled repo auctions within each monthly
reserve maintenance period and at any time there are two sets of repos outstanding. Each
auction is timed to coincide with the repayment of loans from a previous auction, providing
banks with the opportunity to refinance when loans fall due. Indeed, the repo auctions we
1The ECB’s fixed rate tenders are studied empirically by Breitung and Nautz (2001). Nyborg and
Strebulaev (2001) develop a theoretical model.
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study are oﬃcially known as the ECB’s main refinancing operations.
There are four broad themes to our analysis. First, we compare and contrast bidder
behavior and auction performance in repo auctions with what has been documented in
treasury auctions [e.g. Nyborg, Rydqvist, and Sundaresan (2002)]. These important multi-
unit auctions are similar in terms of design and in having active secondary markets for the
auctioned assets. Nevertheless, the dominant economic issues are potentially quite diﬀer-
ent. In treasury auctions, primary dealers buy to resell. The empirical evidence shows
that bidders are less aggressive and underpricing is larger as volatility increases, suggest-
ing that bidders have private information about the resale value and adjust rationally for
the winner’s curse [Cammack (1991), Nyborg, Rydqvist and Sundaresan (2002)].2 In repo
auctions, bidding banks may be more concerned with covering their liquidity needs than
turning a profit; they may be more concerned with the loser’s nightmare than the winner’s
curse (Nyborg and Strebulaev, 2004). Furthermore, the wide range of eligible collateral
may lead bidders to be willing to pay a larger rate for the first units they win, if the
cheapest eligible collateral is scarce.
We find that as volatility increases, bidders shade their bids less and underpricing falls.
This is the opposite of the treasury auction finding. It suggests that private informa-
tion and the winner’s curse are not so important in repo auctions. Other tests we carry
out support this view. The negative eﬀect of volatility on discounts (bid shading) and
underpricing may reflect that bidders need the funds from the auction to satisfy reserve
requirements and are risk averse with respect to the alternative of borrowing in the in-
terbank market. Such risk aversion could arise because of limited depth in the interbank
market or because short banks fear being squeezed (the loser’s nightmare). Another con-
trast with treasury auctions [Nyborg, Rydqvist, and Sundaresan (2002)] is that auction
size matters; discounts and underpricing are increasing in auction size. This is consistent
with there being a shortage of the cheapest eligible collateral.
Second, we examine the impact on bidding and performance of other exogenous vari-
ables that seem particularly pertinent to the ECB’s repo auctions. The variable that has
the most significant explanatory power is the level of the two week interbank rate relative
to the auction’s minimum bid rate. As the spread between these two rates fall, bidders
2See also Bjønnes (2001) and Keloharju, Nyborg, and Rydqvist (2005).
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shade less, disperse less, and submit fewer bids. Bidders also start dropping out of the
auction. These findings suggest that the minimum bid rate is a binding constraint. This
may reflect collateral considerations, but can also reflect expectations that the ECB will
lower the minimum bid rate in time for the next auction. We also find evidence that bid-
ders become more aggressive when award ratios (award as a percentage of demand) in the
previous auction were more dispersed across bidders. This is consistent with the loser’s
nightmare being important; a theoretical model by Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004) shows
that bidders are more aggressive when short positions are more pronounced, because the
costs of being squeezed and the benefits from squeezing are larger. That awards from
the previous week’s auction aﬀect bidding in the current auction suggests not only that
positions matter, but that borrowing in the interbank market is not a perfect substitute
for borrowing in the auction. The interbank market does not appear to be suﬃciently fric-
tionless so as to iron out any imbalances with respect to reserves that may have originated
from the previous auction.
Third, we examine the intertemporal behavior of bidders. Since there are up to five
auctions within each reserve maintenance period, bidders have a choice as to which auctions
to bid in. We find that banks “cycle”; that is, they participate more heavily every second
auction. This could be consistent with a loser’s nightmare story. The idea is that if
a bank borrowed heavily two auctions ago, it will have a large refinancing need in the
current auction (unless it has taken countervailing trades in the meantime) and therefore
bids aggressively. Supporting this, we find some evidence that bidders’ are relatively more
aggressive when they received relatively large awards two auctions ago. Cycling could also
be consistent with bidders being collateral constrained since collateral that was used in
last week’s auction may not be available for this week’s auction.
Fourth, we study diﬀerences in bidding behavior and performance among diﬀerently
sized bidders. An important feature of the ECB’s repo auctions is that there are hundreds
of bidders, from large international banks to small local cooperatives. We document that
large bidders systematically borrow at lower rates in the auctions than small bidders. The
explanation for this is twofold; large bidders submit bids at lower rates and, as a group,
their bids are less dispersed than small bidders. These findings are consistent with the
view that small bidders have poorer access to the interbank market, but could also be
driven by diﬀerences in the collateral held by small and large bidders.
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We also examine large and small bidders’ role in the phenomenon known as underbid-
ding, where banks demand less in aggregate than what they collectively need to satisfy
reserve requirements.3 Underbidding is viewed as a problem from the ECB’s perspective
because it disrupts the implementation of monetary policy and leads to an increase in the
volatility of interbank rates. It is also costly for the banking sector since the liquidity
shortfall must be made up by borrowing at the ECB’s lending facility, which is 100 basis
points above the minimum bid rate in the auction. Banks that borrow more in the auc-
tion than what they need to satisfy reserve requirements provide a positive externality to
other banks, since this reduces the collective recourse to the use of the lending facility.
So underbidding is fundamentally a free-riding problem; when rates are expected to fall,
each bank is relying on other banks to borrow suﬃciently much in the auction to allow
the bank to obtain the reserves it needs in the interbank market at a reduced rate once
the ECB announces lower rates for the future. Standard externality arguments [Olsen and
Zeckhauser (1966), Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986)], would suggest the underbid-
ding problem to be driven by smaller banks free-riding on larger banks. Instead, we find
something of a reverse free-rider problem; in the underbid auctions, the largest bidders
cut back demand more than the smallest ones. This supports the view that small bidders
are more fearful of getting a smaller allocation in the auctions than large bidders because
they have poorer access to the interbank market.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the
role of the auctions in the ECB’s operational framework. Section 3 raises some theoretical
considerations. Section 4 contains the main empirical analysis, and Section 5 studies
diﬀerences in behavior between large and small bidders. Section 6 concludes. An appendix
contains the estimation of the conditional volatility of the two-week rate.
3ECB (2003, p.42) defines underbidding as “. . . the submission by credit institutions of aggregate bids
which fall short of the amount needed to allow for a smooth fulfillment of reserve requirements in the period
until the next MRO [main refinancing operation] is conducted.” To try to deal with the underbidding
problem, in November 2001 the ECB switched from a bi-monthly to a monthly review of the minimum
bid rate. This did not help; since then, several more auctions were underbid. In March 2004, the ECB
implemented more substantial changes (see Section 5.2).
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2 Data and Markets
2.1 Background
The repo auctions we study in this paper are the ECB’s main open market operations
and are used to inject liquidity into the banking sector. Besides the repo auctions, there
are two additional core features of the ECB’s operational framework.4 First, the ECB
requires banks in the euro area to hold minimum reserves as an average over the reserve
maintenance period.5 These requirements are announced at the beginning of each main-
tenance period and the bulk of the reserves are then supplied through the repo auctions
(ECB, 2002a). Second, at any time, banks can obtain overnight credit (against collateral)
through the marginal lending facility and they can make deposits at the deposit facility.
These rates are 100 basis points above and below, respectively, the minimum bid rate in
the auction, making the auctions a more attractive source of liquidity for banks. Because
the auctions are the main source of reserves for banks and because theymust satisfy reserve
requirements, banks have a need to participate in the auctions. Banks that do not obtain
suﬃcient reserves in the auctions and cannot find what they need in the interbank market,
must make up the shortfall at the end of the reserve maintenance period by borrowing at
the lending facility or pay a penalty of 250 basis points relative to the lending rate.
Short term interbank rates are influenced by the size of the auctions relative to reserve
requirements. If the auctions are “small” so that at the end of the maintenance period
liquidity is in short supply, banks will have to use the marginal lending facility and the
overnight rate will rise. On the other hand, if the auctions are “large” so that liquidity is
abundant, banks will have to use the deposit facility and the overnight rate will fall. The
ECB’s policy is to steer liquidity conditions in a neutral way; that is, to adjust auction
volumes so that banks can be expected to precisely fulfill their reserve requirements over
the monthly period and so that aggregate reserve surpluses and deficits are equally likely
(ECB, 2002b). There is some residual uncertainty, however, because it is diﬃcult to
exactly forecast exogenous flows to and from the banking sector, for example due to the
collection of taxes or changes in the circulation of banknotes, and because the last auction
in each maintenance period is usually held a few days before the end of the period. As
4For a more detailed account, see ECB (2002a) or Bindseil (2004).
5During the sample period, a new reserve maintenance period starts on the 24th of each month.
5
a result, at the end of the maintenance period the overnight rate typically either spikes
up or down, as documented by Hartmann, Manna, and Manzanares (2001) or Figure 1.
Under a liquidity neutral policy, fluctuations in the overnight rate can occur because of
expectations of changes to the minimum bid rate and the standing facilities or because
of changes in the relative market power between banks that are short and long reserves
relative to their average requirements.
2.2 The Auctions
For this study, the ECB compiled a file with individual bidding data and summary statistics
for its main repo auctions over a one year period, starting with the auction held on 27
June 2000 and ending with the auction held on 26 June 2001. The dataset contains the
complete set of bids, broken down by bidder, in all 53 main repo auctions (main refinancing
operations) held during this period. The auctions are scheduled well in advance; the
intended timing of all regular operations in a year are announced three months before the
start of the year. There is a main refinancing operation every week, each with a tenor
of two weeks.6 The terms are typically announced on Mondays, 3.30 pm through wire
services, and the deadline for submitting bids is typically on Tuesdays, 9:30 am. Results
are announced the same day at 11:20 am. Winning bids are settled the following business
day. In each auction, each bidder can submit up to 10 bids which are rate-quantity pairs
for two week money. The tick size is 1 basis point and the quantity multiple is 100,000
euros. Unlike US Treasury auctions, for example, there are no non-competitive bids. In
total, our sample contains 29,833 individual demand schedules from 1,199 diﬀerent bidders,
coming from all twelve euro area countries. The auctions are all discriminatory. The data
covers 12 complete reserve maintenance periods. The last auction in the dataset is the
first auction in the 13th period.
Bidders’ ability and willingness to participate in the auctions depend on the collateral
that they hold. There are two tiers of eligible collateral (ECB, 2002a). Tier one consists of
marketable debt instruments fulfilling uniform euro area-wide eligibility criteria (mainly
6Once a month, the ECB also holds longer-term refinancing operations with a maturity of three months.
We do not study these auctions. The ECB may also hold non-regular, fine-tuning operations with non-
standard maturities, for example overnight, but none occurred during the sample period.
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Government bonds and covered bonds issued by banks). Tier two consists of other “mar-
ketable” securities, predominantly debt instruments such as CD’s, but equity has also
been used, and “non-marketable” assets such as bank loans. Tier two eligibility criteria
are established by each national central bank, subject to approval by the ECB. The range
of eligible collateral for the auctions is thus much wider than for interbank repos, where
essentially only government bonds can be used. The eligible collateral that cannot be used
in interbank repos may have a relatively low opportunity cost and may thus be preferred
by bidders. As an example, in December 2000, government bonds comprised 58% of eli-
gible collateral, with bank bonds making up 31%; but government bonds only comprised
39% of the collateral that was pledged in the auctions, with bank bonds constituting 50%
(ECB, 2001b). Diﬀerent eligible collateral may also have diﬀerent opportunity costs since
it is diﬃcult for the central banks to make haircuts perfectly equilibrating. Collaterali-
sation techniques vary across the euro area. In a majority of countries, national central
banks operate a pooling system whereby counterparties open a pool account to deposit
assets, the total value of which collateralises all their borrowing from the central bank.
A minority of national central banks operate an earmarking system whereby collateral is
individually earmarked to each ECB repo operation.
An important feature of the auctions is the minimum bid rate, which is strictly enforced
and announced in advance. This reservation rate was changed only three times during the
sample period. It started out at 4.25%, changed to 4.5% in time for the 5 September 2000
auction, then increased to 4.75% in time for the 11 October 2000 auction, and finally fell
back to 4.50% for the auctions held on and after 14 May 2001. The minimum bid rate and
the standing facilities in force throughout the sample period are illustrated in Figure 1.
Although the standing facilities and the minimum bid rates were stable for long periods,
they were in principle subject to change at the meetings of the ECB’s Governing Council,
normally held on the first and third Thursday of each month during the sample period.
The auctions are subject to relatively little supply uncertainty. With the auction
announcement, the ECB also publishes an estimate of liquidity needs for the entire banking
sector for the following week. Given the ECB’s neutral allotment policy, this provides
bidders with an unbiased estimate of the auction size. We refer to this liquidity neutral
amount as the expected auction size. However, the ECB does not commit itself to a
particular auction size, and it happens that the realized auction size diﬀers from the
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expected size (see Figure 2). The mean expected size is 89.6 billion euros and the mean
realized size is 88.9 billion euros. Some of the diﬀerence reflects updates in the ECB’s
liquidity forecasts after the auction announcement. But the largest diﬀerences are caused
by the two underbid auctions (numbers 34 and 42). The standard deviation of the size
surprise is 5.8 billion euros (1.7 billion if excluding the two underbid auctions). The
absolute value of the diﬀerence is 1 billion euros or less in 29 auctions. Thus deviations
from the expected auction size tend to be relatively small.
The number of bidders in each auction varies from 240 to 800. Figure 3 provides a
histogram of the frequency of participation across bidders. 29 bidders participate in all 53
auctions and 101 bidders participate in only one auction. Table 1 provides participation
statistics on a per maintenance period basis. Panel (a) shows, for example, that 2,938
individual bidder demand schedules are submitted in the first maintenance period and
2,441 of these include winning bids. In the 12th maintenance period, these numbers fall
to 1,814 and 1,524, respectively. The number of bidders in the first period is 949, but only
623 in the 12th period. Panel (b) shows that slightly more than a third of the banks in
the sample bid in an auction in every maintenance period and slightly more than a fourth
receive a positive auction allotment every maintenance period. The averages are 7.861
and 7.279 periods, respectively. Panel (c) shows that across banks the average number of
auctions where they bid is 24.9 and the average number of auctions where they win some
units is 20.2. Finally, the downward time trend in the number of bidders during the sample
period is illustrated on an auction by auction basis in Figure 4. In the first auction, there
are 800 bidders and in the last auction, there are only 452.
The bidders in the auction are small compared with the auction size. The average bid-
der demands only .37% of the expected auction size. Bidders are also very heterogeneous.
On average, the largest bidder receives 6.8% of awards, with a maximum of 26.6%. On
average, 64.6% of bidders in a given auction submit multiple bids. The distribution of the
number of bids within individual bidder demand schedules is in Figure 5. The mode is 1,
the median is 2, and the mean is 2.4.
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2.3 The Secondary Market
Secondary market rates provide a measure of the opportunity cost of borrowing in the
auction. We use them to calculate discounts (bid-shading) and underpricing. The level of
secondary market rates relative to the minimum bid rate may also aﬀect bidder behavior.
Since the funds obtained in the auctions have a two week tenor, we are particularly inter-
ested in two week rates. We are also interested in longer term rates in order to compute
forward rates, from which we can gauge rate expectations.
We use the two week Eonia swap rate to benchmark the auctions. The Eonia (euro
overnight index average) is an overnight rate computed as a weighted average of all
overnight unsecured lending transactions in the interbank market initiated within the
euro area by a set of panel banks. The Eonia is calculated on a daily basis by the ECB on
behalf of the European Banking Federation. It is a widely used reference rate and is the
euro equivalent to the federal funds rate in the US. Like the fed funds rate, the Eonia is
highly volatile compared with other short term rates (see Figure 1). The two week Eonia
swap provides banks with a way to hedge the risk from borrowing overnight over a two
week period. The counterparty that pays the fixed leg receives the Eonia rate. Cash flows
are nominally exchanged every day, but money does not physically exchange hands before
the two weeks are up. By going short (paying fixed) the swap, a bank creates a nearly per-
fect hedge against borrowing on a daily basis in the interbank market. Thus an alternative
to borrowing in the auction is to short the swap and borrow on an overnight basis over
two weeks. The Eonia swap market is one of the most liquid segments of the euro area
money markets.7 The other two main two week contracts, deposits and interbank repos,
are less liquid. Furthermore, the deposit rate is for unsecured loans and is therefore not
directly comparable with borrowing in the auction, which is collateralized. The interbank
repo rate is also not comparable, since it is possible to use considerably cheaper collateral
in the auction than in an interbank repo, for example mortgage bonds and bank loans.
Due to the low credit risk, high liquidity, and good hedging properties of the Eonia swap
contract, the two week swap rate is arguably the most appropriate two week rate in terms
of benchmarking the auction. This is consistent with the views expressed by traders we
7See ECB (2001a), which also documents that the one week to one month maturity range is the one
with the highest turnover in the Eonia swap market.
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have interviewed. But no interbank contract is a perfect match to the loans in the auc-
tion.8 So we will also provide some statistics on how bidding in the auction compares to
the deposit and repo rates.
Bid and ask quotations for the three two week rates were recorded from Reuters pages
at 9:15 am every day throughout the auction sample period. The swap series, which we
also use to compute secondary market conditional volatility, runs from 4 January 1999 to
2 July 2001. The bid-ask spread for the swap rate tends to vary between 2 and 3 basis
points. Deposit and repo rate spreads are around 5 to 6 basis points. The mid-point of
the bid and ask quotes is taken to be the best estimate of actual transaction rates.
Finally, we use Euribor (Euro Interbank Oﬀered Rates) to compute forward rates.
Euribor are important reference rates for interbank term deposits and is computed using
the average rates quoted at 10:45 am every day by the same panel banks as for the Eonia.
To gauge rate expectations, we use the one and two month rates to calculate the one month
forward rate (the one month rate one month from today to two months from today). This
forward rate is chosen because it is the shortest one we can calculate that avoids overlap
with the current reserve maintenance period. Thus it reflects rate expectations rather than
current liquidity conditions.
Figure 1 depicts the swap, deposit, 1 month forward, and the Eonia rates during the
auction sample period.9 The spikes and troughs in the Eonia are related to the end of the
reserve maintenance period (see above). The figure shows that our sample period covers
a period of rising as well as falling rates and rate expectations. This is fortuitous, since it
allows us to examine the extent to which bidder behavior and performance is aﬀected by
the direction of rate expectations. One might expect this to matter, perhaps because of
the presence of the minimum bid rate.
3 Theoretical Considerations
In this section, we discuss the theoretical ideas that have motivated the empirical analysis
below or have influenced how we interpret our results.
8Although the Eonia swap itself has very low credit risk, the Eonia is an unsecured overnight rate and
therefore contains credit risk, albeit less than a two week deposit contract.
9The repo rate tracks the swap and deposit rates. It is therefore omitted from the figure.
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Winner’s Curse
There is a strong common values element to the ECB’s repo auctions since there is a very
active and competitive secondary market for two week funds. If players have private infor-
mation about post-auction secondary market rates, they face the winner’s curse. We would
expect rational bidders to adjust for the winner’s curse by bidding more cautiously when
uncertainty increases [Wilson (1977), Milgrom and Weber (1982)]. We would therefore
expect to see bidders respond to an increase in volatility by decreasing the rates at which
they bid and perhaps also the quantity they demand, as discussed by Nyborg, Rydqvist,
and Sundaresan (2002) in the context of treasury auctions. Thus, under the hypothesis
that bidders have private information about post-auction rates and adjust rationally for
the winner’s curse, discounts and underpricing should be increasing in volatility.10
Collateral: Private Values and Downward Sloping Demand
The requirement to provide eligible collateral may introduce a private values component
to the auctions. There is a wide range of eligible collateral and diﬀerent banks may
hold diﬀerent types having diﬀerent opportunity costs. Additionally, banks may face
collateral constraints in the sense that they have to use increasingly expensive collateral
as the auction size grows. Thus the collateral requirement may induce downward sloping
demand curves at the individual bank level and in the aggregate. If banks are collateral
constrained, we would expect to see an increase in auction size to lead to more bid-shading,
more bid dispersion, less quantity demanded, and more underpricing.
The Loser’s Nightmare
The liquidity neutral policy of the ECB means that at any given point in time, some
banks are running reserve deficits relative to their average daily reserve requirements,
while others are running surpluses. Whether a bank is short or long reserves is to a large
extent subject to exogenous shocks. For example, a bank may suddenly find itself short
of liquidity because of large withdrawals. Short banks that do not obtain adequate funds
in the auction may risk being squeezed in the interbank market; they may be charged an
above fair market borrowing rate. That is, they face the loser’s nightmare [Simon (1994),
Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996)]. Since banks can always borrow (against collateral) at the
10An exception (with respect to underpricing) could occur if the seller reduces the auction size when
bidding is weaker, something which the ECB does not do.
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ECB’s marginal lending facility, the loser’s nightmare costs a bank at most 100 basis points
per unit it is short. Banks may therefore have target amounts in the auction in order to
reduce their reliance on the secondary market and exposure to the loser’s nightmare.11 In
a theoretical model that captures this idea, Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004) show that when
there is a bigger dispersion in bidders’ pre-auction positions, i.e., when short positions are
more extreme, bidding is more aggressive; shorts have more to lose from winning nothing
and longs have more to gain from winning a lot.
4 Empirical Analysis of Bidding and Performance
This section examines how bidder behavior and auction performance is influenced by
various exogenous variables such as volatility and auction size. We compare and contrast
our findings with those in the treasury auctions literature.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 provides three panels with summary statistics of the exogenous and endogenous
variables. The exogenous variables capture interest rate volatility, levels, and expectations
as well as auction size and the projected number of bidders. The endogenous variables
include bid-shading, intra-bidder dispersion, and underpricing measures. We also include
a number of participation and award concentration measures.
4.1.1 Exogenous Variables
The exogenous variables are summarized in Panel (a). The daily conditional volatility
of the swap rate is computed from a GARCH(1,1) model with dummies to capture key
events within the reserve maintenance period (see the Appendix for details). On auction
days, the volatility averages to 4.273 basis points (bp), which is roughly the same as for
non-auction days, and varies from 1.176 bp to 8.538 bp. By way of comparison, during
the sample period the average daily volatilities of 1 and 12 month EURIBOR is 2.7 bp
11A trader told us that in his bank they usually operate with a target amount. They are concerned
about being substantially short, because other banks are likely to ask very high rates if and when they
find out.
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and 3.6 bp, respectively.12 The relatively large volatility of the swap rate reflects the high
volatility of the underlying Eonia, which has an average daily volatility of around 14 bp.
The expected auction size is the liquidity neutral amount as announced before the
auction by the ECB (see Section 2). It averages to 89.585 billion euros and ranges from 5
to 177 billion euros.
The swap spread is the two week Eonia swap rate less the minimum bid rate. Bidders’
abilities to shade and spread out their bids may be compromised when the swap rate is
close to the minimum bid rate, something which we will examine in the regression analysis
below. The average swap spread is 8.132 bp and the range is from -5.500 to 48.250 bp. It
is unusual for the swap spread to be nonpositive. The four cases where we have a negative
swap spread reflect strong views held by some players that the ECB would decrease the
minimum bid rate for the next auction. Two of the auctions with a negative swap spread
are underbid (bid-to-cover below 1).
The forward spread is the one month forward rate (from one month in the future
to two months) minus the minimum bid rate. This captures interest rate expectations.
When rates are expected to fall (rise), banks have a preference for doing the bulk of
their borrowings of central banks funds late (early) in the maintenance month. In the
regressions below, we will examine to what extent this aﬀects bidding. Under the old
fixed rate tender procedure, the bid-to-cover ratio rose as rates were rising. It became
increasingly attractive to use collateral to borrow at the fixed rate tender rate and then
turn around in the interbank market and lend at a much higher rate. The forward spread
has an average of around 15.53 bp and varies from -26.65 bp to 62.66 bp. It is consistently
positive throughout the first six maintenance periods and mixed thereafter. The smallest
forward spread occurs on the auction held on 10 April 2001, which also has a negative
swap spread and is underbid. The forward and swap spreads tend to move together; they
have a correlation coeﬃcient of .69.
The projected number of bidders is included in order to control for the falling time trend
discussed in Section 2. This variable is computed by regressing the number of bidders in
the current auction on the numbers in the two previous auctions. This is not meant to be
the best model for forecasting the number of bidders, but is a simple solution for dealing
12Computed as standard deviations of the first diﬀerenced time series.
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with the time trend. Letting Nj denote the number of bidders, the estimated regression
equation is
Nj = 127.67 + 0.22Nj−1 + 0.53Nj−2
(1.96) (1.85) (4.59),
(1)
where t-statistics are reported in brackets below the regression coeﬃcients. The regres-
sion is adjusted for first order autocorrelation using the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation.
Comparing the summary statistics for the projected number of bidders to the statistics
for the actual number of bidders [Panel (c)], we see that the projection captures the mean
(as it should) but underestimates the actual variability.
4.1.2 Endogenous Variables: Bidding
Panel (b) describes the bidding variables. All of these are calculated on an intra-bidder
level; each variable is computed for each of the 29,833 individual demand schedules. Our
approach follows Nyborg, Rydqvist, and Sundaresan (2002); we view a bidder’s collection
of bids in an auction as a distribution and then use the moments to measure bidder
behavior. In particular, denote the set of bids (rate, quantity pairs) submitted by bidder
i in auction j by {(rijk, qijk)}mijk=1, where mij is his number of bids. The quantity weighted
average rate of these bids is rij =
P
k wijkrijk, where wijk = qijk/
P
k qijk. The discount is
then defined as:
discountij = Rj − rij , (2)
where Rj is the secondary market rate (deposit, swap, or repo) right before the auction
deadline (see Section 2). The discount is positive for all three two-week rates. The discount
relative to the deposit rate is the highest (4.657 bp) , followed by that of the swap rate,
(3.333 bp), and finally the repo rate (.040 bp). This reflects that deposit rates tend to
be higher than swap rates which in turn are higher than repo rates, due to diﬀerences in
collateral requirements and credit risk.
The higher order moments are defined along similar lines as the discount:
Standard deviationij = STDij =
vuutmijX
k=1
wijk (rijk − rij)2. (3)
Skewnessij =
1
STD3ij
"mijX
k=1
wijk (rijk − rij)3
#
, (4)
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and
Kurtosisij =
1
STD4ij
"mijX
k=1
wijk (rijk − rij)4
#
. (5)
In cases where a bidder submits only 1 bid, we define the skewness to be 0 and kurtosis to
be 1.13 The average standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis are 0.704 bp, -0.018, and
1.529, respectively. However, there is a considerable variation across individual demand
schedules.
The relative bid quantity of bidder i in auction j is
P
k
qijk
Qj
, where Qj is the expected
auction size. The average is .367%. It goes as low as .001% and as high as 80%. The
maximum occurs in the smallest auction. The number of bids, mij, has an average of 2.397
and ranges from 1 up to the admissible maximum of 10.
4.1.3 Endogenous Variables: Performance and Participation
Panel (c) contains variables measuring auction performance and participation. Except for
the award ratio, these measures are all on an auction by auction basis.
Award ratio is defined for individual demand schedule and is the quantity awarded
as a fraction of quantity demanded. A bidder’s award ratio in a given auction will be
high if his bids are high relative to those of other bidders. In that sense, award ratio
captures the relative aggressiveness of the bidder. Award ratios range from 0 to 1, with
an average of .610. A large dispersion of award ratios in a given auction suggest that
there are large surprises in the allocations to bidders and that some bidders may emerge
from the auction with “large” short positions and others with “large” long positions,
relative to average daily reserve requirements. We therefore call the standard deviation of
award ratios within auctions imbalance. Under the hypothesis that short squeezing is an
important feature of these markets, we would expect that the risk of short squeezing is
increasing in the imbalance. Our imbalance measure ranges from 0 to .442 with an average
of .302.
Underpricing is defined as the two week rate minus the quantity weighted average
winning rate. Like the discount, underpricing is measured relative to the three two-week
13The rationale is as follows: A single bid can be regarded as the limit as c goes to zero of two bids of
identical sizes at prices b+ c and b− c. The standard deviation is c, the third moment is 0, and the fourth
moment c4. Hence, skewness is zero and kurtosis one. In the limit, as c goes to zero, skewness remains
zero and kurtosis one.
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rates. Underpricing is 2.959 bp relative to the deposit rate and 1.643 bp and -1.347
bp relative to the Eonia swap and repo rates, respectively. In other words, the average
winning bidder pays a rate which is between the swap and repo rates. That underpricing
is negative with respect to the repo rate probably reflects that banks use cheaper collateral
in the auction than what they can use in the interbank repo market. Using the swap rate
as a benchmark, the evidence is that it is cheaper to borrow in the auction than in the
interbank market. Since the typical bid-ask spread of the swap rate is around 2-3 bp and
underpricing is measured relative to the midpoint of the spread, we see that bidders in the
auctions are, roughly speaking, obtaining the funds at the swap bid rate. This confirms
interviews we have had with traders who told us that banks do not view bidding in the
auctions as a profit-making activity. Nevertheless, they participate because they need
the funds. In our discussions below, we will normally take underpricing to be measured
relative to the swap rate unless otherwise specified.
The stopout spread is defined as the stop-out rate minus the minimum bid rate and
averages to 4.849 bp. The relatively large magnitude of the stopout spread reflects that the
secondary market rates were considerably above the minimum bid rates for long periods
over the sample period, as seen in the swap spread statistics.
Since, in a given reserve maintenance period, banks earn interest on their reserves equal
to the average stop-out rate, it is interesting to see how winning rates compare with stop-
out rates. From the variable winrate-stopout, we see that the banking sector tends to pay
around 1.640 bp more for their reservable funds than they earn from the ECB. Together,
the winrate-stopout and stopout spread variables inform us that the typical rate paid in
the auction is approximately 6.5 bp above the minimum bid rate.
The average number of bidders across auctions is 563 and 459 typically win some units.
The variation in participants as well as winners is large, going from 240 to 800 and 154 to
705, respectively. The variable manybids measures the percentage of bidders in an auction
who submits multiple bids. We see that 64.574% typically do so.
Award concentration is measured by the Herfindahl index on a scale from 1 to 100 and
averages to 2.124. This is approximately what it would be if we had 50 equal bidders.
Comparing this to the average number of bidders illustrates the considerable size variation
that exists across bidders. Award/demand concentration is the Herfindahl index based on
award divided by the Herfindahl index based on demand. The average of this ratio is 1.368,
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showing that award tends to be more concentrated than demand. The average bid-to-cover
ratio is 2.064, but varies from 0.471 to 16.661. The highest bid-to-cover occurred in the
smallest auction. Finally, the largest (by award) 1, 10, and 50 bidders typically receive
6.819%, 34.340%, and 72.201% of the auction. Keeping in mind that more than 500 banks
typically participate in each auction and the average bank demands less than 0.4% of the
auction, this is further illustration of the large variation in size among participating banks.
4.2 Regression Analysis
In this section, we run a number of regressions to examine how bidder behavior and auction
performance varies with exogenous factors. To allow for the possibility that bidders behave
diﬀerently when rates are expected to rise as compared to when rates are expected to fall,
we create two new exogenous variables. To capture falling rate expectations, we define the
forward spread(-) to be equal to the forward spread if this is negative, and 0 otherwise.
To capture rising rate expectations, we define forward-swap(+) to be the forward rate less
the swap rate if this is positive, and 0 otherwise.14
To examine the loser’s nightmare hypothesis, we include last auction’s imbalance mea-
sure as a regressor. Under the hypothesis that the loser’s nightmare and short squeezing
is a consideration for bidders, we would expect to see bidding being more aggressive when
last auction’s imbalance is high. On the other hand, if the interbank market is perfect, we
should not see lagged imbalance aﬀect bidding in the current auction.
The regression results are reported in Table 3. We have selected those endogenous
variables from Table 2 that we think are the most important and interesting. Panel (a)
contains the bidder level regressions and Panel (b) contains the auction level regressions.
Panel (a) regressions are weighted least squares run on individual demand schedules with
bidder fixed eﬀects. The weight on each demand schedule in auction j is 1/Nj , where Nj
is the number of bidders. To correct for correlations in errors within auctions, standard
errors are computed using Rogers’ (1983, 1993) method. A recent finance application and
further discussion of this approach can be found in Vuolteenaho (2002). Bidder dependent
14Analogously to the forward spread(-), we could also define the variable forward spread(+) as being
the forward spread if this is positive, and zero otherwise. A problem with this variable is that it would
give rise to a potential multicollinearity problem in our regressions since it has a correlation of .68 with
the swap spread.
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variables are included in order to examine how past behavior and awards influence current
bidding.15 The variable AR1 is the bidder’s award ratio in the last auction and AR2 is his
award ratio two auctions ago. NOTBID1 and NOTBID2 are dummy variables which are
1 if the bidder submitted a bid one or two auctions ago, respectively, and zero otherwise.
Panel (b) regressions are run using the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure.
We discuss the regression results by focusing on one exogenous variable at a time,
starting with volatility and moving from left to right in the table. The last four regressors
are discussed in the next subsection which addresses the intertemporal behavior of bidders.
The volatility of the swap rate impacts negatively on underpricing and discounts. A
one basis point increase in volatility leads to a decrease in the discount by a significant .374
bp and a decrease in underpricing by a significant .526 bp. In other words, banks bid more
aggressively when volatility is high. This is the opposite of what previous research has
documented for treasury auctions [Nyborg, Rydqvist, Sundaresan (2002), Bjønnes (2001),
Keloharju, Nyborg, and Rydqvist (2005)] and is the opposite of what one would expect
from winner’s curse based arguments. Also unlike the evidence from treasury auctions,
there is no evidence that bidders cut back demand when volatility is high. Volatility is
also statistically significant in the standard deviation regression; a one basis point increase
in volatility increases standard deviation by .043 bp.16
These findings on volatility suggest that private information about secondary market
rates and the winner’s curse are not important considerations in the ECB’s repo auctions.
However, they do not prove it. One hypothesis is that while banks have private valuations
for the bulk of central bank funds they need, and therefore do not face a winner’s curse for
those units, they may also bid for units that they intend to lend in the interbank market.
If so, banks may face a winner’s curse for those marginal units. To investigate this, we
15To deal with cross-correlation, we have also run Panel (a) regressions by first taking averages of the
independent variables for each auction and then run the regressions using these. This averaging procedure
precludes using bidder-level exogenous variables. We have done this using the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure
to deal with any possible autocorrelation. The results are practically identical to those in Panel (a).
Because of the presence of a minimum bid rate, the discount and underpricing regressions should arguably
be run as Tobit regressions. Using the auction average approach, we find that Tobit regressions yield
results which are qualitatively the same as, and quantitatively very close to, the non-Tobit regressions.
16We have run the regressions using diﬀerent models for the volatility, but always with the same quali-
tative results.
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rerun the regressions in Table 3 without the highest bids (chosen several ways). Whether
we throw out the highest bid from each demand schedule with two or more bids, throw
out the highest 10% to 50% of all bids, we continue to find that the volatility coeﬃcient in
the discount regression is statistically significantly negative. The coeﬃcient ranges from
−.181 (throwing out the highest 50% bids) to −.356 (throwing out the highest bid from
each multi-bid demand schedule).17 This supports the view that private information and
the winner’s curse is not a major concern in these auctions, even for marginal units.
As another examination of the private information/winner’s curse hypothesis, we re-
run the Table 3 regressions with a variable intended to proxy for the precision of private
information, under the null hypothesis that bidders possess such. Under the private infor-
mation/winner’s curse hypothesis, the dispersion of bids across bidders would be expected
to be larger when the precision of their signals is poor, as discussed for example by Nyborg,
Rydqvist, and Sundaresan (2002). We therefore calculate the inter-bidder dispersion for
each auction by first computing the quantity weighted average rate of each bidder’s bids
and then taking the standard deviation of these average rates. Then we run the Table 3
regressions with the inter-bidder dispersion as an additional explanatory variable. The
coeﬃcient on inter-bidder dispersion (which is measured in basis points) for selected re-
gressions are as follows (t-statistics in brackets): discount (swap), −.501 (−1.568); relative
bid quantity, .225 (1.673); underpricing, −.723 (2.779).18 Contrary to the private infor-
mation/winner’s curse hypothesis, bidders are slightly more aggressive and underpricing
is smaller when there is more dispersion across bidders. This suggests that inter-bidder
dispersion is determined by something other than private information about secondary
market rates. It is possible that a large dispersion across bidders reflect a larger variability
in collateral or in the value of collateral, but it is unclear how this would translate into
more aggressive bidding. Perhaps a more plausible explanation is that a high dispersion
across bidders arises from aggressive bidding by shorts who attempt to cover.
17The complete regression results are available from the authors upon request.
18These regressions have a potential endogeneity problem (inter-bidder dispersion is endogenous). We
have examined the robustness of the bidder-level regressions by calculating inter-bidder dispersion by
randomly selecting 50% of the demand schedules in each auction and then run the regressions on the
remaining sample. This procedure has been run 100 times. The coeﬃcients are close to those where inter-
bidder dispersion is calculated from all demand schedules per auction. Details of the regression results
and the endogeneity robustness check are available from the authors upon request.
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That private information and the winner’s curse appear to be relatively unimportant
in the ECB’s repo auctions is not necessarily surprising. It is consistent with the ECB
providing information on liquidity conditions and its monetary policy stance on an equal
access basis. It is also consistent with the views expressed by traders we have interviewed.
Although individual banks possess private information with respect to the fulfillment of
their own reserve requirements and their collateral, each bank may simply be too small for
this to yield significant insight into the movement of short term rates. A potential puzzle,
however, is why bidders are more aggressive when volatility is high. One possibility is that
a high volatility is associated with less liquid interbank markets, thus making the auctions
relatively more attractive as a source of central bank funds. Another possibility is risk
aversion; banks may be willing to pay more for funds obtained in the auction when the
interbank rate is more uncertain.
Moving on, we see that the expected auction size impacts positively on the discount,
standard deviation, underpricing, and award ratio. For example, a 10 billion increase in
auction size leads to a statistically and economically significant .19 bp increase in un-
derpricing. This supports the hypothesis that there is a scarcity of the cheapest eligible
collateral. The idea is that as the auction size increases banks start to use more expensive
collateral, thus submitting more bids at lower rates with the added result that their bids
are more spread out. The negative coeﬃcients on the relative bid quantity and bid-to-cover
ratio are supportive of the view that collateral is limited. These also explain the positive
coeﬃcient on the award ratio.
The swap spread is highly significant in most regressions and is also the main reason the
R2’s are so high. For each basis point increase in the swap spread, the discount increases
by .262 basis points. Put diﬀerently, for each basis point the swap rate moves away from
the minimum bid rate, bidders’ average bids move up by only approximately .738 bp.
A basis point increase in the swap spread increases underpricing by .106 bp. The swap
spread also has a significant impact on dispersion: standard deviation increases by .032 bp
per basis point increase in the swap spread and skewness changes by -.003 bp. Kurtosis
increases by .005 bp. The swap spread also impacts positively on the number of bids per
bidder. These findings suggest that the minimum bid rate is a binding constraint. When
the swap spread is large, bidders have more room to spread out and shade their bids. We
also see that more banks participate as the swap spread increases. This may be because
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of an expectation of a larger underpricing, or it may be because players with relatively
expensive collateral find it worthwhile to participate. Finally, the swap spread has no
notable eﬀect on the quantity variables, including award concentration and bid-to-cover.
This is not surprising because the expected auction size is equal to the amount of reserves
that banks need.
Next, we discuss rate expectations. Note as a first “result” here that the regressions
in Table 3 are reported without the forward-swap(+) variable as a regressor because in
almost all cases it has no eﬀect.19 That rising rate expectations are not important for
discounts and underpricing may at first glance appear surprising, since one might expect
banks to be more eager to get reserves early when rates are expected to rise. However,
a bank’s alternative to borrowing in the auction is to obtain reserves in the interbank
market. The insignificance of the forward-swap(+) points to that banks adjust their bids
according to the swap rate rather than the forward rate.
In contrast, it appears that falling rate expectations matter. Looking down the forward
spread(-) column in Table 3, we see that as the forward spread gets more negative, bidders
shade less and underpricing is smaller. A one basis point decline in the forward spread(-)
translates into a .163 bp decrease in the discount and a .179 bp decrease in underpricing. It
seems that the stronger are the expectations that rates will fall, the smaller are discounts
and underpricing. This is counterintuitive. We believe this is an artifact of the minimum
bid rate. When the market expects rates to fall and the forward spread becomes negative,
the swap spread also falls towards the minimum bid rate and in some cases below it.
This creates a positive regression coeﬃcient on the forward spread(-) in the discount and
underpricing regressions since bids cannot be submitted below the minimum bid rate. To
examine this interpretation, we create a dummy variable which is 1 if the swap spread is
non-negative and 0 if it is negative and interact this with the forward spread(-). We then
run the regressions with this interaction variable in place of the forward spread(-). The
regression coeﬃcients on the discount and underpricing are now insignificant, supporting
our hypothesis that the apparent eﬀects of falling rate expectations are an artifact of the
minimum bid rate.20
19Including the forward-swap(+), we find that it is significant in only two cases. It has a significantly
positive eﬀect on the number of bids per bidder and on the variable manybids.
20The detailed regression results with the interaction term are not reported in the paper, but are
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The projected number of bidders has no eﬀect on the discount or underpricing and a
negative eﬀect on award concentration and bid-to-cover. We have also run the regressions
without the projected number of bidders, with no notable changes.
The imbalance (standard deviation of award ratios) from the last auction has a statis-
tically significantly negative eﬀect on both discounts and underpricing. This is consistent
with the loser’s nightmare hypothesis. We also see that when last auction’s imbalance
is higher, skewness in the current auction falls. This would be consistent with bidders
shifting the bulk of their bids up to relatively higher rates while leaving an opportunistic
bid at a relatively low rate. The fact that the results from the previous auction aﬀects bid-
ding in the current auction also suggests that there are frictions in the interbank market,
particularly for large trades. It seems that bidders prefer waiting until the next auction
with smoothing out some of the allocation imbalances from the most recently held auction
rather than relying completely on the interbank market to do so.
4.3 Intertemporal Behavior
In this section we investigate whether banks “cycle”; that is, whether they participate
more heavily in every other auction. Related to that, we also look at to what extent a
bidder’s past awards aﬀects his bidding in the current auction.
Since the repos in the auctions are for two weeks, a bank could in principle cover its
liquidity needs by borrowing only in every other weekly auction. Nevertheless, to decrease
its reliance on a particular cycle of auctions, a bank may wish to participate evenly in
every auction; that is, aim to borrow 50% of its daily average reserve requirement in each
auction. A bank that starts out with the objective of equal participation in each auction,
however, may find itself deviating from that objective because of liquidity shocks, for
example due to unexpectedly large customer withdrawals, or because of an unexpectedly
large or small award ratio in an auction. Such a bank may find itself cycling if it deals
with the shock predominantly by adjusting its demand in the auctions rather than through
transactions in the interbank market.
We first examine the frequency with which bidders participate. This is measured by
the run, which is the time between the current auction the bidder is participating in and
available from the authors upon request. We thank an anonymous referee for the interaction term idea.
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the last. For example, if a bidder participates in auction numbers 1, 2, and 7, there is
one run of 1 and one of 5. We measure runs based on bids and awards and find that
bidders overwhelmingly tend to participate in adjacent auctions. Out of 28,633 bid runs,
22,477 are runs of 1 and 4,206 are runs of 2. Out of 23,158 award runs, 15,766 are runs
of 1 and 4,892 are runs of 2. This suggests that bidders attempt to smooth their auction
participation.
Next, we calculate the autocorrelation of bid and award sizes for bidders who partici-
pate in every maintenance period. This reduces the number of bidders to 407. For each
bidder we first calculate the relative bid size (relative to expected auction size) and relative
award size (relative to realized auction size) for each auction. Then we compute the two
first autocorrelations of these two measures. Finally, we average across all 407 bidders.
The results are in Table 4. We see that both bidding and award have negative first order
autocorrelation but positive second order autocorrelation. Furthermore, the number of
bidders with negative autocorrelation outweigh those with positive autocorrelation. This
is reversed for the second order autocorrelation. Thus banks cycle.21
This is consistent with banks viewing the auctions as the main arena for obtaining
their reserves, with the interbank market serving more of a fine-tuning role. This apparent
preference for borrowing in the auctions, for many banks, supports the view that the loser’s
nightmare is an issue in the market for central bank funds.
The regressions in Table 3 look more formally at how a bidder’s past awards impact on
his bidding in the current auction. AR1 and AR2 in Table 3 are a bidder’s award ratios in
the previous auction and the one before that, respectively. The regressions control for the
event that a bidder did not participate in either of the last two auctions by including the
dummies NOTBID1 and NOTBID2. While last week’s award ratio, AR1, and the award
ratio two weeks ago, AR2, do not aﬀect discounts, they have significant impact on other
variables. The coeﬃcients on AR1 are statistically significantly negative for the number
of bids, the standard deviation of bids, and the relative bid quantity. In contrast, AR2
21The maturities of loans for the penultimate and ultimate auctions in a reserve maintenance period falls
in the next maintenance period. We have also examined cycling within maintenance periods by regressing
current demand and award on those two (or one) auctions ago, conditional on the auctions being in the
same maintenance period. The results, which are available from the authors upon request, are along the
same lines, though slightly weaker, as in Table 4.
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has significantly positive impact on the relative bid quantity and this week’s award ratio.
Thus, the regression results are in line with the evidence we have just seen on cycling.
A bidder who had a relatively large award ratio in last week’s auction, tends to be less
aggressive in the current week’s auction in terms of his bid quantity. A bidder who had
a large award ratio two weeks ago, and therefore faces large refinancing needs, increases
his demand in the current auction and also submits his bids at high rates relative to other
bidders, as evidenced by his current award ratio turning out to be relatively large.
5 Bidder Heterogeneity and Underbidding
5.1 Large versus Small Bidders
We start by examining the overall performance of large versus small bidders. One might
expect large bidders to do better, since by virtue of being large, they have more to gain
from investing time, eﬀort, and resources in the bidding process. We break the sample up
into 12 fixed groups of 100 banks each (99 in the group of smallest bidders) based upon
the average relative bid size for each bank across all auctions that the bank participated
in. The groups are ordered from smallest (group 1) to largest (group 12). An advantage of
working with fixed rather than auction-dependent size groups is that any diﬀerences that
we find in terms of performance, for example, can be attributed to systematic diﬀerences
among specific groups of banks rather than diﬀerences in private information, refinancing
needs, collateral portfolios, etc at given points in time. Another advantage is that by
working with fixed groups, we can also examine whether diﬀerently sized banks are able
to time their purchases to coincide with high underpricing.22
Table 5 provides means and standard errors of nine bidder level variables for each of
the 12 groups as well as two group level variables (group standard deviation and stopout
deviation). For each group, g, the means of the bidder level variables, with the exception
of number of auctions, are computed by first averaging across bidders in the group for
22Our categorization of “large” and “small” banks is based on bid sizes rather than on balance sheets.
What one normally would think of as a large bank, may well be a small bank in terms of bid size, and
vice versa. We have constructed a similar table to Table 5 also for auction-dependent size groups, with
similar results.
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each auction and then averaging across auctions.23 This is equivalent to taking a weighted
average across all demand schedules with a weighting of 1
53Njg
for each schedule submitted
in auction j, where Njg is the number of bidding banks from group g in auction j (and 53
is the number of auctions). So the standard errors are calculated by weighing individual
demand schedules submitted in auction j by 53Njg. This puts an equal weight on each
auction and thus corrects for the decreasing time trend in the number of bidders. The
number of auctions is the number that a bank participated in, averaged across bidders in
the group.
The first row in Table 5 is the average relative bid quantity across bidders in each group,
conditioned on participation. There is substantial variation across groups. The average
participating bank in the largest group typically bids for 1.983% of expected auction size
and receives 60.3% of that. Banks in the smallest group typically bid for 0.003% and
receive 64.1% of that. So in terms of amounts bid for and amounts awarded, banks in the
largest size group are several hundred times larger than banks in the smallest size group.
The table reveals a substantial diﬀerence in the performance of large and small bidders;
larger bidders achieve a higher underpricing than smaller bidders. Comparing groups 12
and 1 we see that the larger group has an underpricing of 2.016 bp, while the underpricing
for the smaller group is -.040 bp. In other words, across auctions, group 12 bidders obtain
funds at 2.056 bp less than group 1 bidders.
In Table 6, we test the hypothesis that diﬀerently sized bidders perform diﬀerently.
The table reports the pairwise diﬀerences in mean underpricing between groups, with p-
values in brackets. We can see that group 12 has a significantly bigger underpricing than
all other groups, with the exception of groups 11 and 10. Group 1 has a significantly
smaller underpricing than all other groups. The table confirms that larger bidders borrow
cheaper on average than smaller bidders.
The higher underpricing of the larger bidders is in part caused by their higher discounts.
For example, the discount for Group 12 is 3.010, while for Group 1 it is 2.148.24 Another
23Using underpricing as an example, the formula for the reported mean for group g consisting of 100
bidders is as follows:
underpricing group g =
53X
j=1
1
53
P100
i=1 underpricingij
Njg
,
where underpricingij is bidder i’s achieved underpricing in auction j.
24In a previous version of this paper, we reported the statistics in Table 5 using equally weighted averages
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important reason for the higher underpricing of larger bidders can be seen by looking
at the dispersion of bids across bidders within groups. We have two measures of this.
The group standard deviation is calculated by taking the standard deviation of bidders’
discounts for each auction and then averaging across auctions. The stopout deviation
measure represents the typical deviation of bids around the stop-out rate for each group.
It is calculated as follows: First, for each bidder and for each auction, we calculate the
deviation from the stop-out rate by subtracting from it the quantity weighted average
rate bid. Second, for each bidder, we calculate the square root of the average squared
deviation from step 1. Third and finally, for each group, we take the average from step 2
across bidders. These measures show that larger bidders have bids that are more clustered
and also more tightly distributed around the stop-out rate than smaller bidders. For
example, the group standard deviations for groups 12 and 1 are, respectively, 1.624 and
3.879. The stopout deviations are, respectively, .047 and .253. As a result, smaller bidders
tend to win with higher bids than larger bidders, thus leading to less underpricing for the
smaller bidders.
The clustering of bids and lower stopout deviation of larger bidders could be consistent
with their having more precise information than smaller bidders.25 But it could also be
consistent with several other hypotheses. First, large bidders may have better access to
the Eonia swap market; for example, they may run a smaller risk of being squeezed or
they are able to negotiate better trades. If so, they can aﬀord being less aggressive than
smaller bidders. Although the Eonia swap market is in principle equally open to all banks,
smaller banks often lack the resources, sophistication, and will (at board level) to make use
of derivative contracts. A high group dispersion may be the result of aggressive bidding
by banks that are running large reserve deficits and fear the interbank market. Second,
large bidders may be more homogeneous in terms of the collateral they possess; there
may be more small bidders with either very cheap or very expensive collateral. Third,
large bidders may be more strategic and perhaps smarter in how they submit their bids.
across all demand schedules for each group. Calculated this way, there is no diﬀerence in discounts across
groups — because smaller bidders participated more heavily in the early auctions when the swap spread
and discounts tended to be relatively large — but there is still less underpricing for the larger groups.
25Such an interpretation is oﬀered by Hortacsu and Sareen (2004), who introduce the stopout deviation
measure in their study of Canadian treasury auctions.
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There is some anecdotal evidence that some small banks submit their bids well before the
deadline, thus giving themselves a competitive disadvantage since their bids do not fully
incorporate market conditions (e.g. the swap rate) at the time of the auction. Table 5 also
shows that large bidders tend to use more bids. This might suggest that they have a wider
range of collateral, but it might also be that using more bids is strategically advantageous.
Without more detailed data regarding reserve positions, trades in the interbank market,
and collateral as well as a formal model of these auctions, it is diﬃcult to say which of
these hypotheses comes closest to explaining the superior performance of large bidders.
If large bidders have more precise information than small bidders, we might expect
large bidders to obtain larger awards in auctions that are more heavily underpriced. To
examine this, we regress each size group’s relative bid quantity, bjg and the group’s relative
award quantity, ajg on a constant and underpricing, uj, where j denotes the auction and
g the group. Note that uj is the underpricing for the auction as a whole (as defined in
Table 2); it is not dependent on the group. We thus obtain two underpricing “betas” for
each size group. If large bidders can time their purchases, we should see their beta being
positive and that of small bidders being negative. The findings are reported in Table 7.
For the “bid betas”, only the one for group 2 is significant. For the “award betas”, only
the one for group 11 is significant, and it is negative. We conclude that there is no evidence
that large bidders borrow more in more heavily underpriced auctions, suggesting that large
bidders are not better informed than small bidders.
5.2 Underbidding
We now turn to studying the two underbid auctions, where banks demanded less in aggre-
gate than the liquidity neutral amount. Several auctions held after the end of our dataset
have also been underbid. Thus, from time to time, there is a breakdown in the ability
of the auctions to bring to the banking sector the liquidity it needs to maintain reserve
requirements. Understanding this breakdown is important. From the banking sector’s
perspective, it is costly. After the two underbid auctions in our dataset, banks borrowed
more than 60 billion euros at the marginal lending facility, paying a 100 bp premium over
the minimum bid rate. From the ECB’s perspective, underbidding is undesirable because
it disturbs the implementation of monetary policy. Indeed, to combat underbidding, in
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March 2004 the ECB changed the tenors of their auctions from two to one week and also
changed reserve maintenance periods to match the time between the meetings of the ECB’s
Governing Council where the minimum bid rate in the auctions are set (ECB, 2003). These
are the most significant changes to the ECB’s operational framework since the launch of
the euro in 1999.
Table 8 provides summary statistics from the two underbid auctions. These were held
on 13 February 2001 and 10 April 2001 and are the 34th and 42nd auctions, respectively,
in our dataset. Demands in these two auctions are only 74.2% and 47.1%, respectively, of
the liquidity neutral amounts which are 88 and 53 billion euros, respectively, and banks
receive their demands in full. The realized auction sizes equal quantity demanded. An
interesting aspect of these auctions is that the contemporaneous swap rate is below the
minimum bid rate in the auction; the swaps spreads are -.5 bp for auction 34 and -5.5
bp for auction 42. Hence a bank could get cheaper funding by shorting the swap (paying
fixed) and borrowing on an overnight basis for two weeks as compared with borrowing in
the auction.
Given the negative swap spreads, one may ask why bid in the auction at all? Of
course, if no banks bid, banks would have to pay the 100 bp penalty of the marginal
lending facility for the entire amount they need to satisfy reserve requirements. In this
case, the swap rate would certainly move up and it would be desirable to bid in the auction
after all. Those that actually stay in the auction when the swap spread is negative may
be banks that have particularly large liquidity needs and are more concerned about the
loser’s nightmare. Furthermore, the depth of the below minimum bid rate quotes were not
suﬃcient to cover the entire auction.
As discussed in the Introduction, a plausible hypothesis is that underbidding is driven
by small banks who rely on large banks to get the collectively required funds into the
banking system. To examine this free-rider hypothesis, we break the bidders up into
fixed size groups. To get a finer picture than before, we use diﬀerent groups than in the
previous section; namely, the largest 20, 21-50, 51-100, 101-200, and 201-1199. Table 9
Panel (a) reports the average amount bid for, amount awarded, and number of bidders for
these size groups, excluding auctions 34 and 42. We see that normally 16.8 of the top 20
banks participate and bid for a total of 75.3% of the auction. Of the bottom 999 banks,
415.6 normally participate and as a group they bid for 30.0%. Panel (b) reports on the
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same variables for the two underbid auctions. The comparisons between the underbid and
the normal auctions are striking. While the top 20 banks normally buy 34.7%, in the
two underbid auctions they buy only 25.3% percent. In contrast, the bottom 999 banks
normally buy 14.5%, but in the two underbid auctions they buy 18.7%. Similarly, the
101-200 largest banks normally buy 12.7%, but in the two underbid auctions they buy
16.3%. In other words, the top 20 banks normally buy about 7.6 percentage points more
than the bottom 1099 banks. In the two underbid auctions, the top 20 buy 9.7 percentage
points less than the bottom 1099. Panel (c) confirms the statistical significance of these
diﬀerences between normal and underbid auctions.
As a robustness check on our finding that large bidders cut back more in the two
underbid auctions, in Table 10 we examine the eight auctions that straddle each of the
underbid auctions. We see that the fractional amount borrowed by the top 20 banks is
reduced in both of the underbid auctions relative to the straddling auctions.
The fact that large bidders act as free-riders suggests that they consider themselves
fairly small in the big picture. This is perhaps not surprising given that the largest bank
in an average auctions gets only around 6% of the auction. But that large banks underbid
more than small banks is surprising. Our finding may be driven by larger banks having
better access to the swap market. Other possibilities are that small bidders happened to
be more short than large bidders at the time of the underbid auctions or that they are less
strategic than the large bidders.
6 Conclusion
This paper documents several empirical regularities with respect to bidding and perfor-
mance in the ECB’s repo auctions. The auctions we study are characterized by hundreds
of bidders seeking to borrow central bank funds on a collateralized basis and are the source
of the majority of central bank money in the euro area. The amount auctioned is in prin-
ciple exactly what banks collectively need to fulfill reserve requirements. However, an
individual bank has the choice between obtaining reservable funds in the auction, in the
interbank market, or from the standing facility of the ECB at 100 basis points above the
auction minimum bid rate.
We first examine how bidders react to exogenous factors and compare this to what
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has been documented in the treasury auctions literature. Among other things, we find (i)
an increase in volatility leads to more aggressive bidding and less underpricing, perhaps
because bidders are risk adverse relative to the alternative of obtaining funds in the in-
terbank market; and (ii) an increase in auction size leads to less aggressive bidding and
more underpricing, perhaps because bidders have to use increasingly expensive collateral
as the auction size grows. These findings diﬀer from those in treasury auctions (Nyborg,
Rydqvist, and Sundaresan, 2002) and suggests that the economics of repo auctions may be
diﬀerent. For example, our findings suggests that private information about post-auction
rates and the winner’s curse are less important in repo auctions than in treasury auctions.
Second, we find that the interest rates at which banks bid tend to fall between the
auction minimum bid rate and the two-week Eonia swap rate. Relative to this benchmark,
auction underpricing averages to 1.64 basis points. Underpricing increases in the diﬀerence
between the swap rate and the auction minimum bid rate. We find evidence consistent
with the view that the minimum bid rate is a binding constraint, particularly when the
market expects the central bank to lower it in upcoming auctions.
Third, we study the intertemporal behavior of bidders. We find that past auction
results influence bidding. For example, a larger imbalance across bidders of awards relative
to demands in the previous auction leads to more aggressive bidding, with underpricing
falling. This is consistent with the view that the loser’s nightmare is a concern for bidders
in these auctions (Nyborg and Strebulaev, 2002). The auctions follow an overlapping
cycle; there is one every week for two week money. We find that individual banks cycle;
that is, they tend to participate more heavily every other auction. Our findings suggest
that banks view the auctions as the main arena for obtaining reservable funds, with the
interbank market serving more of a fine tuning role, perhaps because of limited depth in
the interbank market.
Fourth, we examine the performance of large versus small bidders and find that large
bidders do better in the sense of having a lower underpricing. This is driven by large
bidders shading their bids more as well as having more concentrated bids. We also find
that in the two underbid auctions in our sample, large bidders cut back demand more than
small bidders. These findings suggest that large bidders may be less adverse to using the
interbank market than small bidders.
Much of our evidence points towards considerations regarding the fulfillment of reserve
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requirements and collateral being important, with the loser’s nightmare appearing to be
a concern for bidders. Investigating this in more detail would be an important avenue for
future research. A challenge here is obtaining data on the fulfillment of reserve require-
ments, the use and holdings of collateral, and details on interbank trades. From a policy
perspective, it may be important to investigate the extent to which banks in diﬀerent
regions may have an advantage in terms of collateral. Anecdotal evidence suggests this
may be the case. For example, the availability of government bonds varies across countries
and is particularly high in countries such as Italy and Greece with high government debt
levels. Also, the market for bank bonds, such as pfandbriefe, which are eligible collateral
in the ECB’s repo auctions and have a long history in Germany, have only recently started
to spring up elsewhere in Europe.26
From a theoretical perspective, our findings suggest that an important line of future
research on multiunit auctions would be to embed the auctions in a richer setting where
players are concerned about their positions in the underlying asset both before and af-
ter the auction, perhaps because they may be squeezed if they are short. Some eﬀorts
along these lines have already been made by Chatterjea and Jarrow (1998) and Nyborg
and Strebulaev (2004). However, we are not familiar with models that consider the se-
quential feature of repo auctions within the reserve maintenance period. Thinking about
the interaction between the auctions and the secondary market is clearly also important
from a policy perspective. For example, Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004) show that if the
policy objective is to minimize short squeezes and market distortions, then a uniform price
auction may be better than a discriminatory auction. However, if the policy objective is
to maximize revenue, then a discriminatory auction may be better. Of course, neither
of these mechanisms may be optimal in the rich setting of the real world. Our findings,
however, suggest that when it comes to optimal auction design, inventory issues and the
interaction between the auctions and the secondary market may be as important as infor-
mation issues in some settings. Although our setting is very diﬀerent, this is reminiscent
of a conjecture made by Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Weber (1979, p.1275) that “some of
the variance in bids observed in oﬀ-shore oil lease auctions may be due to strategic, rather
than informational, factors.”
26See, e.g., Association of German Mortgage Banks (2004).
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7 Appendix: Conditional Volatility Estimation
To estimate the conditional volatility of the two week swap rate, we apply a modified
GARCH(1,1) model (Bollerslev, 1986) to daily rate changes. As in Hamilton’s (1996)
study of the fed funds rate, we use calendar eﬀects to capture the eﬀect of fixed events such
as the end and beginning of the maintenance period, ECB Governing Council meetings,
the end and beginning of the month, and main and longer term refinancing operations.
Not all of these events are in the final specification. Since interest rates tend to be mean-
reverting and since conditional volatilities sometimes react asymmetrically to increases and
decreases in rates, we also introduce stochastic variables to capture this. In particular, we
use a dummy variable which takes the value 1 when the swap rate fell the previous day
and 0 otherwise. We also use the “short-end” slope of the term structure of interest rates.
The final model specification and our results are in Table 11. The final specification
has been chosen based upon a variety of diagnostic tests. We have examined closely the
joint distributions of standardized residuals and standardized squared residuals [see, e.g.,
Engle and Ng (1993)]. We reject the hypothesis that the residuals or squared residuals
could be autocorrelated. It should be noted that our empirical results are robust to many
other model specifications for the process of conditional volatility.
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Table 1
Participation
Panel (a) presents the following statistics for each of the 13 maintenance periods for which we have data: the
number of demand schedules submitted in all auctions within the maintenance period, the number of bidders who
participated in at least one auction, the number of demand schedules that won some award, and the number of
bidders who won some award. Panel (b) tabulates the number of banks that participated and won some award
in from 1 to 12 maintenance periods. (This panel excludes the 53rd auction in our sample, since this is the
only auction we have data for in the 13th maintenance period). Panel (c) tabulates the number of banks that
participated in and won some award in from 1 to 53 auctions. N is the total number of banks who bid and won
in our sample.
Panel (a): Demand schedules and bidders per maintenance period
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Demand schedules 2938 3608 2606 2362 2954 2302 2033 2601 2190 1620 2353 1814 452
Bidding 949 919 850 822 796 841 779 774 738 680 662 623 452
Winning schedules 2441 2427 1957 1906 2482 2084 1986 2407 1724 1423 1687 1524 262
Winning 865 843 767 746 758 812 772 737 678 604 576 577 262
Panel (b): Number of maintenance periods per bank
mean std 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Bidding 7.861 4.068 120 85 64 55 50 68 63 72 59 75 81 407
Winning 7.279 4.202 125 78 62 66 52 70 62 69 79 79 83 327
Panel (c): Number of auctions per bank
mean std 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-53 N
Bidding 24.861 17.557 254 89 114 81 100 87 69 86 94 225 1199
Winning 20.258 16.034 268 120 122 106 98 87 72 87 84 108 1152
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics on the exogenous variables (Panel (a)), the bidding variables (Panel (b)), and the
participation and performance variables (Panel (c)). s.e. denotes the standard error of the mean, and
N is the number of observations. Volatility of swap rate is the conditional volatility of the two week
swap rate on auction days (see the Appendix). Expected auction size is the liquidity neutral amount,
which is computed from the liquidity figures announced by the ECB prior to each auction. Swap
spread is the difference between the two week swap rate and the minimum bid rate. Forward spread
is the difference between the Euribor forward rate from 1 month to 2 months and the minimum bid
rate. Projected number of bidders is obtained by a regression as described in the text. Discount and
underpricing are the differences between the secondary market rates (deposit, swap, and repo) and the
quantity-weighted average bid rate within each demand schedule and the quantity-weighted average
winning rate, respectively. Standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis are all quantity-weighted intra-
bidder measures. Relative bid quantity is the quantity demanded by a single bidder relative to the
expected auction size. Relative auction size is the quantity allotted in a given auction relative to
the expected auction size. Largest 1, 10 and 50 is the alloted share of the 1, 10 and 50 largest (by
award) bidders in a given auction. Manybids is the percentage of bidders who submit more than 1
bid in a given auction. Stopout spread is the difference between the stopout rate and the minimum
bid rate. Winrate-stopout is the difference between the quantity-weighted average winning rate and
the stopout rate. Award concentration is the Herfindahl index. Award/demand concentration is the
Herfindahl index based on awards divided by the Herfindahl index based on demand. Imbalance is the
standard deviation of award ratios, which are quantity awarded as a fraction of quantity demanded
at the individual demand schedule level. Bid-to-cover is the quantity demanded in a given auction
divided by the expected auction size. Units of measurement are in the second column.
units mean std s.e. min max N
Panel (a): Exogenous Variables
Volatility of swap rate bp 4.273 1.217 0.167 1.176 8.538 53
Expected auction size bln 89.585 31.669 4.350 5 177 53
Swap spread bp 8.132 8.775 1.205 -5.500 48.250 53
Forward spread bp 15.530 22.077 3.032 -26.652 62.657 53
Projected number of bidders 555.588 78.848 11.041 391.241 711.357 50
Panel (b): Bidding Variables
Discount (deposit) bp 4.657 4.369 0.025 -60.500 51.500 29833
Discount (swap) bp 3.333 4.478 0.026 -59.500 48.250 29833
Discount (repo) bp 0.040 4.122 0.024 -67 42 29833
Standard deviation bp 0.704 0.901 0.005 0 28.284 29833
Skewness -0.018 0.482 0.003 -4.984 13.712 29833
Kurtosis 1.529 1.709 0.010 1 189.005 29833
Relative bid quantity % 0.367 1.491 0.009 0.001 80 29833
Number of bids 2.397 1.434 0.008 1 10 29833
Panel (c): Performance
and Participation
Underpricing (deposit) bp 2.959 2.545 0.350 -4.645 10.064 53
Underpricing (swap) bp 1.643 2.492 0.342 -5.645 6.762 53
Underpricing (repo) bp -1.347 3.096 0.425 -10.488 5.564 53
Stopout spread bp 4.849 6.951 0.955 0 43 53
Winrate-stopout bp 1.640 1.404 0.193 0.145 6.468 53
Number of bidders 562.925 116.188 15.960 240 800 53
Manybids % 64.574 14.325 1.968 13.750 80.571 53
Number of winners 458.679 115.100 15.810 154 705 53
Award concentration 2.124 1.424 0.196 1.122 8.875 53
Award/demand concentration 1.368 0.627 0.086 0.928 4.615 53
Imbalance 0.302 0.134 0.018 0 0.442 53
Bid-to-cover 2.064 2.178 0.299 0.471 16.661 53
Largest 1 % 6.819 4.302 0.591 3.131 26.598 53
Largest 10 % 34.340 9.312 1.279 23.848 64.763 53
Largest 50 % 72.201 7.409 1.018 61.973 94.450 53
Relative auction size % 99.410 8.698 1.195 47.073 109.434 53
Award Ratio 0.610 0.400 0.002 0 1 29833
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Table 3
Regression Analysis
Regressions of the following dependent variables: discount (swap), standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, relative bid quantity, award ratio, number
of bids per bidder, underpricing (swap), number of bidders, manybids, largest10, bid-to-cover. The explanatory variables are, from left to right:
volatility of swap rate, expected auction size, swap spread, forward spread(-) (forward spread if negative, 0 otherwise), projected number of bidders
and imbalance. For Panel (a) there are four more variables: AR1 and AR2 (the bidder’s award ratio in the last auction and two auctions ago,
respectively), NOTBID1 and NOTBID2 (dummy variables which are 1 if the bidder submitted a bid one or two auctions ago, respectively, and zero
otherwise). Panel (a) regressions are weighted least squares regressions (where weight is proportional to the number of bidders in each auction) run
on individual demand schedules with fixed bidder effects. Standard errors are computed using Rogers’ (1983, 1993) robust standard error method
to calculate cross-correlation consistent estimates as discussed in Vuolteenaho (2002). Panel (b) regressions are run with the Cochrane-Orcutt
procedure to correct for autocorrelation. For panel (a), N is the number of demand schedules across all auctions 4 to 53. In both panels we do not
use the first three auctions because we do not have the projected number of bidders for them. t-statistics are reported in brackets.
units C volatility expected swap forward proj # imbalance NOTBID1 AR1 NOTBID2 AR2 Adj R2 N
swap size spread spread (-) bidders
bp bln bp bp 100’s
Panel (a): Bidding variables
Discount (swap) bp -0.060 -0.374 0.008 0.262 0.163 0.048 -5.541 0.035 0.036 0.114 -0.197 0.496 27594
(-0.249) (-2.259) (1.032) (4.051) (3.609) (0.186) (-3.198) (0.167) (0.141) (0.426) (-0.608)
Std bp -0.003 0.043 0.001 0.032 0.007 -0.022 -0.084 -0.037 -0.147 -0.011 0.061 0.183 27594
(-0.144) (2.338) (1.936) (12.334) (2.291) (-0.929) (-0.515) (-1.415) (-4.119) (-0.520) (2.181)
Skewness 0.001 -0.005 -0 -0.003 -0.003 0.009 -0.089 -0.002 -0.004 0.002 -0.062 0.010 27594
(0.148) (-1.015) (-2.721) (-2.867) (-3.628) (1.721) (-1.911) (-0.174) (-0.382) (0.190) (-5.304)
Kurtosis -0.004 0.013 0 0.005 -0 0.053 0.046 -0.088 -0.138 0.025 0.061 0.003 27594
(-0.326) (1.383) (0.904) (1.890) (-0.085) (3.415) (0.264) (-3.364) (-3.282) (0.311) (1.937)
Relative bid quantity % -0.009 -0.028 -0.009 0.009 0.013 -0.197 0.352 -0.096 -0.198 0.205 0.239 0.056 27594
(-0.207) (-0.620) (-2.168) (1.268) (1.397) (-1.430) (0.989) (-2.093) (-2.349) (1.480) (1.713)
Award Ratio 0.007 -0.011 0.003 -0.009 -0.009 0.033 -0.006 0.014 0.047 0.050 0.112 0.166 27594
(0.345) (-0.684) (4.273) (-1.705) (-2.302) (1.166) (-0.030) (0.624) (1.664) (1.935) (3.446)
Number bids per bidder -0.009 0.038 0.003 0.032 0.026 0.036 -0.043 -0.127 -0.339 -0.076 0.142 0.170 27594
(-0.251) (1.210) (2.043) (3.834) (5.120) (1.003) (-0.115) (-3.198) (-7.044) (-1.608) (2.290)
Panel (b): Performance and
participation variables
Underpricing (swap) bp 0.656 -0.526 0.019 0.106 0.179 0.346 -4.708 0.700 50
(0.444) (-3.524) (3.008) (3.002) (5.380) (1.606) (-3.316)
Manybids % 51.538 0.542 0.085 0.500 1.413 0.183 0.805 0.686 50
(4.620) (0.821) (3.619) (2.583) (5.812) (0.124) (0.088)
Largest 10 % 74.468 0.975 -0.156 0.108 -0.138 -4.993 13.947 0.475 50
(6.787) (1.810) (-4.336) (0.634) (-0.955) (-3.030) (1.974)
Number of bidders 100’s 1.124 0.029 0.010 0.037 0.055 0.476 -0.635 0.722 50
(1.469) (0.485) (4.550) (2.829) (5.384) (4.182) (-0.916)
Bid-to-cover 11.159 -0.143 -0.038 0.044 0.074 -0.850 2.338 0.328 50
(1.667) (-0.721) (-2.331) (1.278) (1.847) (-1.177) (1.281)
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Table 4
Autocorrelation of Quantity Demanded and Awarded
First and second autocorrelation coefficients for bids (quantity de-
manded) and awards (quantity awarded) (relative to the expected
auction size and allotted quantity, respectively) for bidders who
participated in each maintenance period in our sample. The re-
ported mean across bidders is equally weighted. % positive is the
percentage of bidders with positive autocorrelations. N is the num-
ber of bidders.
mean t-stat % positive min max N
bids, 1st -0.028 -3.843 31.695 -0.644 0.561 407
bids, 2nd 0.126 12.765 68.796 -0.144 0.846 407
award, 1st -0.114 -10.106 27.273 -0.721 0.804 407
award, 2nd 0.300 26.278 91.155 -0.432 0.842 407
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Table 5
Small versus Large Bidders: Fixed Groups
Each bidder is placed in a group from 1 to 12 based upon his average relative bid quantity throughout the total sample for
auctions he participates in. Group 1 consists of the 99 smallest bidders, Group 2 consists of the next 100 smallest bidders,
..., Group 12 consists of the 100 largest bidders. For each group, Panel (a) reports the means of: relative bid quantity,
award ratio, discount (swap), underpricing (swap), standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, number of bids, and number of
auctions participated in. Standard errors (reported in brackets) are calculated by weighting individual demand schedules by
the number of bids submitted in each auction by each group. Panel (b) reports the means of two group-level variables: group
standard deviation and stopout deviation.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Panel (a): Bidder-level variables
Rel bid quant 0.003 0.006 0.010 0.017 0.026 0.038 0.055 0.080 0.123 0.214 0.432 1.983
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.010) (0.060)
Award ratio 0.641 0.696 0.681 0.681 0.636 0.625 0.637 0.595 0.646 0.608 0.595 0.603
(0.020) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
Underpricing (swap) -0.040 0.680 1.090 1.271 1.568 1.566 1.687 1.838 1.669 1.905 1.964 2.016
(0.425) (0.109) (0.117) (0.094) (0.082) (0.075) (0.072) (0.070) (0.066) (0.060) (0.059) (0.049)
Standard deviation 0.360 0.685 0.648 0.656 0.733 0.660 0.583 0.679 0.690 0.633 0.641 0.696
(0.027) (0.026) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Discount (swap) 2.148 2.215 2.449 2.422 2.773 2.797 2.787 3.059 2.761 3.006 3.085 3.010
(0.250) (0.127) (0.126) (0.096) (0.089) (0.082) (0.077) (0.075) (0.074) (0.070) (0.066) (0.056)
Skewness -0.020 -0.047 -0.021 -0.031 0.008 0.011 -0.027 0 -0.044 -0.041 0.008 -0.009
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
Kurtosis 1.055 1.269 1.329 1.394 1.439 1.460 1.402 1.486 1.652 1.506 1.634 1.802
(0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.019) (0.038) (0.016) (0.074) (0.046)
Number of bids 1.372 1.954 2.128 2.236 2.430 2.346 2.194 2.451 2.496 2.318 2.378 2.554
(0.029) (0.032) (0.037) (0.030) (0.031) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
Auctions participation 9.090 16.570 15.680 21.890 22.280 26.150 26.540 27.300 29.270 30.260 33.500 39.800
(1.111) (1.440) (1.392) (1.601) (1.743) (1.637) (1.643) (1.661) (1.776) (1.740) (1.506) (1.442)
Panel (a): Group-level variables
Group standard deviation 3.879 2.865 2.571 2.363 2.084 2.213 1.975 1.936 2.092 1.838 1.819 1.624
(0.485) (0.269) (0.281) (0.259) (0.214) (0.212) (0.206) (0.202) (0.231) (0.212) (0.185) (0.168)
Stopout deviation 0.253 0.190 0.186 0.164 0.137 0.110 0.109 0.092 0.084 0.094 0.052 0.047
(0.025) (0.027) (0.024) (0.045) (0.019) (0.016) (0.020) (0.011) (0.010) (0.022) (0.003) (0.006)
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Table 6
Pairwise Tests of Differences in Mean Underpricing Between Groups.
Tests for differences in mean underpricing (swap) between the 12 groups in Table 5. The (i, j)th cell is the
difference in underpricing (swap) between groups i and j, where i represents rows and j columns. Differences
are in basis points. P-values are in brackets. Group 12 are the 100 largest bidders and Group 1 consists of
the 99 smallest.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 0.00 -0.72 -1.13 -1.31 -1.61 -1.61 -1.73 -1.88 -1.71 -1.95 -2.00 -2.06
( 1.00) ( 0.03) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00)
2 0.72 0.00 -0.41 -0.59 -0.89 -0.89 -1.01 -1.16 -0.99 -1.23 -1.28 -1.34
( 0.03) ( 1.00) ( 0.01) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00)
3 1.13 0.41 0.00 -0.18 -0.48 -0.48 -0.60 -0.75 -0.58 -0.82 -0.87 -0.93
( 0.00) ( 0.01) ( 1.00) ( 0.22) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00)
4 1.31 0.59 0.18 0.00 -0.30 -0.29 -0.42 -0.57 -0.40 -0.63 -0.69 -0.74
( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.22) ( 1.00) ( 0.02) ( 0.01) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00)
5 1.61 0.89 0.48 0.30 0.00 0.00 -0.12 -0.27 -0.10 -0.34 -0.40 -0.45
( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.02) ( 1.00) ( 0.98) ( 0.28) ( 0.01) ( 0.33) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00)
6 1.61 0.89 0.48 0.29 -0.00 0.00 -0.12 -0.27 -0.10 -0.34 -0.40 -0.45
( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.01) ( 0.98) ( 1.00) ( 0.24) ( 0.01) ( 0.30) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00)
7 1.73 1.01 0.60 0.42 0.12 0.12 0.00 -0.15 0.02 -0.22 -0.28 -0.33
( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.28) ( 0.24) ( 1.00) ( 0.13) ( 0.86) ( 0.02) ( 0.00) ( 0.00)
8 1.88 1.16 0.75 0.57 0.27 0.27 0.15 0.00 0.17 -0.07 -0.13 -0.18
( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.01) ( 0.01) ( 0.13) ( 1.00) ( 0.08) ( 0.46) ( 0.16) ( 0.03)
9 1.71 0.99 0.58 0.40 0.10 0.10 -0.02 -0.17 0.00 -0.24 -0.30 -0.35
( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.33) ( 0.30) ( 0.86) ( 0.08) ( 1.00) ( 0.01) ( 0.00) ( 0.00)
10 1.95 1.23 0.82 0.63 0.34 0.34 0.22 0.07 0.24 0.00 -0.06 -0.11
( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.02) ( 0.46) ( 0.01) ( 1.00) ( 0.48) ( 0.15)
11 2.00 1.28 0.87 0.69 0.40 0.40 0.28 0.13 0.30 0.06 0.00 -0.05
( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.16) ( 0.00) ( 0.48) ( 1.00) ( 0.50)
12 2.06 1.34 0.93 0.74 0.45 0.45 0.33 0.18 0.35 0.11 0.05 0.00
( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.03) ( 0.00) ( 0.15) ( 0.50) ( 1.00)
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Table 7
Regressions of Bid Quantity and Award by Group on Underpricing
Ordinary least squares regressions of (i) relative bid quan-
tity and (ii) relative award on a constant and underpric-
ing (swap). Both regressions are run for each of the 12
fixed groups in Table 5. Bid and award are relative to the
expected auction size and allotted quantity, respectively.
Constants are not reported. t-stats are given in brackets.
Group 12 consists of the 100 largest bidders and Group 1
of the 99 smallest.
bid Adj. R2 award Adj. R2 N
1 0.003 0.049 -0 0 53
(1.624) (-0.065)
2 0.015 0.081 -0.001 0.002 53
(2.113) (-0.278)
3 0.010 0.005 -0.007 0.011 53
(0.524) (-0.750)
4 0.018 0.005 -0.017 0.044 53
(0.501) (-1.528)
5 0.039 0.011 -0.011 0.018 53
(0.762) (-0.975)
6 0.069 0.007 -0.021 0.015 53
(0.599) (-0.889)
7 0.137 0.022 -0.002 0 53
(1.083) (-0.072)
8 0.297 0.051 0.063 0.037 53
(1.651) (1.399)
9 0.132 0.002 -0.043 0.014 53
(0.327) (-0.857)
10 0.384 0.007 0.003 0 53
(0.583) (0.039)
11 0.042 0 -0.396 0.135 53
(0.024) (-2.822)
12 -0.303 0 0.430 0.028 53
(-0.034) (1.207)
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Table 8
Underbidding Case Study: Summary Statistics
Means of various statistics for the two underbid auctions,
34 and 42, in our sample.
units Auction 34 Auction 42
Date 13 Feb 2001 10 Apr 2001
Tender id 20010007 20010018
Maintenance period 8 10
Auction position 4 of 5 3 of 4
Expected size bln 88 53
Bid-to-cover 0.742 0.471
Number of bidders 401 240
Relative bid quantity % 0.185 0.196
Discount (swap) bp -0.944 -5.743
Underpricing (swap) bp -0.700 -5.645
Standard deviation bp 0.138 0.070
Skewness 0.043 0.054
Kurtosis 1.150 1.371
Stopout spread 0 0
Winrate-stopout bp 0.200 0.145
Volatility of swap rate bp 4.425 4.536
Swap spread bp -0.500 -5.500
Forward spread bp -3.476 -26.652
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Table 9
Underbidding Case Study: Summary Statistics for Five Fixed Groups
Panels (a) and (b): For each of five fixed bid-size based groups, we report
means of relative bid quantity (based on expected auction size), award ratio
(based on realized auction size), number of bidders, number of winners,
average number of bids. The groups have been constructed analogously to
those in Table 5. Group 1-20 consists of the 20 largest bidders (by average
relative bid quantity), etc. Panel (a) excludes auctions 34 and 42. Panel
(b) is for auctions 34 and 42 only.
Panel (c): For each group, tests for differences in mean relative award
quantity between the two underbid auctions and all other auctions and
the eight straddling auctions (four auctions before and four auctions after).
P-values in brackets.
1-20 21-50 51-100 101-200 201-1199
Panel (a): All auctions, excluding 34 and 42
Rel. bid quantity: group 75.286 46.205 32.352 28.240 30.047
Award (realized): group 34.692 23.497 14.659 12.682 14.471
Number bidders 16.824 23.824 35.667 64.196 431.863
Number winners 14.804 20.216 29.059 51.235 348.765
Number of bids 2.963 2.524 2.601 2.480 2.373
Panel (b): Auctions 34 and 42
Rel. bid quantity: group 14.948 15.304 9.092 10.018 11.280
Award (realized): group 25.311 25.289 14.415 16.285 18.700
Number bidders 9 14.500 20.500 38 238.500
Number winners 9 14.500 20.500 38 238.500
Number of bids 1.111 1.103 1.073 1.118 1.289
Panel (c): Tests of differences in mean award ratios
not underbid vs 34 -7.352 2.038 -1.583 2.811 4.086
(0) (0.003) (0) (0) (0)
8 straddling vs 34 -7.602 3.607 -1.433 1.992 3.436
(0.003) (0.025) (0.165) (0.003) (0.008)
not underbid vs 42 -13.275 1.570 3.590 4.917 3.198
(0) (0.019) (0) (0) (0)
8 straddling vs 42 -16.680 4.914 3.636 3.317 4.812
(0.010) (0.013) (0.006) (0.051) (0.036)
44
Table 10
Underbidding Case Study: The Straddling Auctions
This table provides some descriptive statistics for auctions 34 and 42 and the four auctions preceding and
succeeding these auctions. Top 20 refers to the 20 largest bidders and Bottom 999 refers to the smallest 999
bidders (see Table 9). Panel (a) covers auction 34 and panel (b) covers auction 42.
-4 -3 -2 -1 34 +1 +2 +3 +4
Panel (a): Auction 34
Expected size 101 104 85 101 88 169 25 153 49
Swap spread 4.500 2 4 0 -0.500 14 2.500 3.500 4.500
Bid-to-cover 1.363 1.140 1.619 1.034 0.742 1.187 4.385 1.241 2.658
Rel. bid quantity: top 20 44.581 41.954 57.950 36.840 19.999 41.193 176.528 44.794 111.445
Award (realized): top 20 28.859 36.566 30.600 35.305 26.948 34.673 33.855 32.114 44.426
Rel. bid quantity: bottom 999 21.889 16.919 22.610 15.318 14.060 15.626 62.076 15.660 35.856
Award (realized): bottom 999 16.748 14.971 15.417 15.009 18.946 13.272 21.307 12.985 14.367
-4 -3 -2 -1 42 +1 +2 +3 +4
Panel (b): Auction 42
Expected size 49 135 49 118 53 177 5 80 79
Swap spread 4.500 6 -4.500 0.500 -5.500 17.500 5.500 3.500 5.500
Bid-to-cover 2.658 1.349 1.174 1.094 0.471 1.456 16.661 1.842 2.088
Rel. bid quantity: top 20 111.445 47.956 35.546 50.517 9.897 65.484 611.664 90.232 86.603
Award (realized): top 20 44.426 36.049 28.577 45.528 21.026 49.037 8.755 48.320 40.948
Rel. bid quantity: bottom 999 35.856 18.855 13.779 11.479 8.500 17.433 210.864 19.061 19.793
Award (realized): bottom 999 14.367 13.230 12.124 10.604 18.057 10.114 25.541 11.102 8.881
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Table 11
Conditional Volatility of Swap Rate
This table reports the results of the conditional volatility
estimation of the two-week swap rate, using a modified
GARCH(1,1) model. Panel (a) gives the coefficients of the
mean equation, while panel (b) gives the coefficients of the
variance equation. Slope is the difference between 12 and
1 month Euribor. Downswap takes the value 1 if the swap
rate fell the previous day and 0 otherwise. Endmonth takes
the value 1 if the day is the last business day of a month
and 0 otherwise, Endres takes the value 1 if the day is
the last business day of a reserve maintenance period and
0 otherwise. Mainrepo takes the value 1 if the day is an
auction day (main refinancing operation) and 0 otherwise.
(-1) stands for the preceding day’s observation. For exam-
ple, endres(-1) is a dummy variable for the first business
day in a maintenance period.
Coefficient z-statistics
Panel (a): Mean equation
Constant -0.003 -1.790
Slope(-1) 0.012 3.592
Downswap(-1) 0.004 2.065
Panel (b): Variance equation
C 0.0009 4.892
ARCH(1) 0.147 3.326
GARCH(1) 0.594 7.028
Endmonth -0.002 -6.283
Endres(-1) -0.001 -5.758
Endres -0.002 -5.192
Mainrepo -0.0004 -5.080
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Figure 1: Standing Facilities, Minimum Bid Rate, and Secondary Market Rates
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Figure 2: Expected Auction Sizes and Differences between Expected and Realized Auction 
Sizes (in bn euro)
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Figure 4: Time Trend of Number of Bidders
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